

THE HONORABLE JAMES L. ROBERT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

KATHERINE MOUSSOURIS, HOLLY  
MUENCHOW, and DANA PIERMARINI,  
on behalf of themselves and a class of  
those similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:15-cv-01483-JLR

**PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS  
CERTIFICATION**

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:  
FEBRUARY 9, 2018

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

2 Representative Plaintiffs Katie Moussouris and Holly Muenchow (“class  
3 representatives”) seek certification of a proposed Class of women who worked for Defendant  
4 Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) in Stock Levels 59-67 in the Engineering and/or I/T  
5 Operations Professions in the United States from September 16, 2012 to the present.<sup>1</sup> All Class  
6 members have claims for systemic compensation discrimination, and Class members in levels  
7 60-64 also have claims for systemic discrimination in promotions. Engineering and I/T  
8 Operations are the two technical Professions at Microsoft in which the class representatives  
9 worked.

10 As the evidence described herein shows, Microsoft has maintained a common,  
11 discriminatory pay and promotions process called, alternately, the Calibration or People  
12 Discussion Process (collectively “Calibration Process”) throughout the Class period. This  
13 Calibration Process results in lower pay and fewer promotions for women compared to their  
14 male peers. Plaintiffs allege that the Calibration Process is a specific employment practice that  
15 causes gender-based pay and promotion outcomes that violate the disparate impact provisions of  
16 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e *et seq.* (“Title VII”) and the  
17 Washington Law Against Discrimination, Rev. Code Wash. § 49.60.010. *et seq.* (“WLAD”).  
18 Plaintiffs also allege that Microsoft engages in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination  
19 against women (disparate treatment) in violation of Title VII and WLAD.

20 Microsoft’s Calibration Process, which determines employees’ pay, promotion, and  
21 performance outcomes, is both unreliable—in that its structural features preclude consistent

22 \_\_\_\_\_  
23 <sup>1</sup> This Court held that the liability period for claims under the Washington Law Against  
24 Discrimination (“WLAD”) begins on September 16, 2012. *See* Dkt. 134 at 18. Additionally, the  
25 Court denied Microsoft’s motion to strike allegations of extraterritorial application of WLAD to  
26 Microsoft employees employed outside the state of Washington but subject to employment  
policies originating at Microsoft’s Washington headquarters. Dkt. 52 at 17-18. Accordingly,  
absent further order from the Court, the Class liability period begins September 16, 2012 for all  
Class members.

1 decision-making between comparable people—and based on invalid criteria. Plaintiffs’ expert  
2 Dr. Ann Marie Ryan, Professor of Organizational Psychology at Michigan State University,  
3 describes the common problems with this process.<sup>2</sup> Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Henry Farber, Hughes-  
4 Rogers Professor of Economics at Princeton University, describes statistically significant and  
5 meaningful gender-based pay differentials caused by the Calibration Process. When controlling  
6 conservatively for relevant characteristics (including controls for job type, job complexity, and  
7 performance metrics), women earn less than their male counterparts.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Farber also concludes  
8 that women have received over 500 fewer promotions than men with their same characteristics  
9 would have received.

10 The Calibration Process operates within the context of a corporate culture that  
11 systematically devalues women’s contributions. This is evidenced by the declarations of  
12 Plaintiffs and other female employees describing their experiences of gender discrimination in  
13 pay and promotions and Microsoft’s culture of bias; over 230 internal complaints to Human  
14 Resources (“HR”) describing gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation; and  
15 company records showing that Microsoft was well aware of the Calibration Process’s adverse  
16 impact on women and did not fix it. Instead, Microsoft has tried to sidestep this issue by  
17 publishing two misleading “pay equity studies” and pursuing diversity and inclusion (“D&I”)  
18 programs that its own HR professionals dismiss as mere window dressing.

19 Plaintiffs’ claims raise common questions of law and fact, the answers to which will  
20 drive the resolution of this litigation. *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 349 (2011).  
21 Plaintiffs seek certification of their claims for injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil  
22 Procedure 23(b)(2), certification of their claims for damages under 23(b)(3), and certification of

23 <sup>2</sup> See Expert Report of Dr. Ann Marie Ryan (“Ryan”), filed herewith.

24 <sup>3</sup> The analysis of data through June 2016 reflects that in less than four years women in  
25 Engineering and I/T Operations have been underpaid between \$100-\$238 million, depending on  
26 whether job title is included in the model. See Expert Report of Dr. Henry Farber (“Farber”),  
filed herewith, ¶ 80 & Table 8. That number is expected to increase as further years of data are  
analyzed.

1 liability under 23(b)(2), (b)(3), and/or (c)(4). Below Plaintiffs include a proposed trial plan  
 2 showing how their claims may be fairly and efficiently adjudicated on a class basis. Plaintiffs  
 3 respectfully submit that their motion should be granted.

4 **II. FACTS**

5 **A. Microsoft's Corporate Organization and Common Employment Practices**

6 **1. Microsoft's Job Classification System Organizes Employees**  
 7 **Performing Similar Work By Profession, Discipline, and Job Title.**

8 Microsoft is a multinational technology company headquartered in Redmond,  
 9 Washington. Microsoft has a uniform system for organizing its employees throughout the  
 10 United States. Whittinghill Tr. at 101:4-13.<sup>4</sup> Microsoft classifies groups of employees doing  
 11 similar work into Professions. *Id.* “A profession is a grouping of functional areas—such as  
 12 Engineering, Sales, Marketing, and Human Resources—with common functional skillsets,  
 13 business results, and success differentiators.” MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00688508 at 513. Within  
 14 Professions, Microsoft classifies employees into subcategories called Disciplines, according to  
 15 “the actual work that the individual is currently doing,” such as “software design engineer test  
 16 [SDET].” Whittinghill Tr. at 102:16-103:4. Within each Discipline, the next and most specific  
 17 level of organization is Standard Title, *id.* at 103:12-16, such as “Program Manager.” The  
 18 proposed Class includes employees in just two of Microsoft's Professions: Engineering and I/T  
 19 Operations. Standard Titles in these Disciplines come in variations reflecting increasing levels  
 20 of seniority, e.g.: I, II, Senior, and Principal.<sup>5</sup> For instance: Program Manager (equivalent to  
 21 “Program Manager I”), Program Manager II, Senior Program Manager, and Principal Program  
 22 Manager. Regardless of which business organization they work in (such as Windows & Devices,

23 <sup>4</sup> Evidence cited herein is attached to the Declaration of Anne B. Shaver in Support of Plaintiffs'  
 24 Motion for Class Certification (“Shaver Decl.”). All corporate documents are attached as  
 25 collective Exhibit A in numerical order by Bates Number. Excerpts of Deposition Transcripts  
 26 are attached as Exs. E to H, in chronological order by deposition date. Declarations and Reports  
 in support of this Motion are submitted separately and referred to herein by last name of author.

<sup>5</sup> Shaver Decl., Ex. B (Career Stage Profiles for Engineering and I/T Operations).

1 Office Products, etc.), employees are categorized by common Professions, Disciplines, and  
2 Standard Titles.

3 Two other aspects of Microsoft’s corporate organization are relevant to this Motion.  
4 First, all employees are assigned to a pay band, called a Stock Level, ranging from 59 to 98.  
5 Ritchie Tr. 521:2-14. [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]. Ritchie Tr. 308:6-13; MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00688508 at 9.  
7 Employees at level 80 or higher are Corporate Vice Presidents or above, Whittinghill Tr. 14:8-  
8 19, up to CEO Satya Nadella who holds level 98. Ritchie Tr. 521:13-14. Employees in levels  
9 68-70 are partners. *Id.* 416:1-3.


10 Second, employees are classified by Career Stage for purposes of guiding their career  
11 progress. Career Stages progress from 2 through 9, and are broken out separately for  
12 Independent Contributors (“IC”), Leads, and Managers. The Career Stages overlap with  
13 Standard Titles, such that, for example, a Program Manager I is Stage 2, a Program Manager II is  
14 Stage 3, a Senior Program Manager is Stage 4, and a Principal Program Manager is Stage 5.<sup>6</sup>  
15 Career Stages have associated “competencies” and “key results” that set forth the “how” and  
16 “what” of each job.<sup>7</sup> Each Discipline shares a common set of competencies and key results.<sup>8</sup>

24 <sup>6</sup> Shaver Decl., Ex. B.

25 <sup>7</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00187720 at 5. *See also* Whittinghill Tr. at 137:20-39:13 (explaining  
that key results areas are about skills and knowledge, whereas competencies are about behavior).

26 <sup>8</sup> Shaver Decl., Ex. B.

1 Women are concentrated in the lowest levels of Engineering and I/T Operations, as  
 2 shown in this diagram:<sup>9</sup>



16 **2. Microsoft Has Used the Calibration Process Throughout the Class**  
 17 **Period to Make Pay and Promotion Decisions.**

18 The Calibration Process is a process in which managers compare employees within peer  
 19 groups to determine performance, pay, and promotion outcomes. From 2011 to May 2014,  
 20 Microsoft used the term “calibration meetings” for this process; since May 2014, it is called  
 21 “People discussions,” but the function has been the same.<sup>10</sup> At these meetings, managers  
 22 compare employees within a peer group, which encompasses employees in multiple stock levels  
 23 doing essentially the same work at different rates of pay. [REDACTED]

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
 25 <sup>9</sup> Farber Table 1. According to Microsoft’s data, there are no employees in Levels 71-79.  
 Accordingly, those levels are not represented in the diagram.

26 <sup>10</sup> Ritchie Tr. at 136:25-138:22; 157:6-8; 229:16-17; 234:5-235:25.

1 [REDACTED].<sup>11</sup> Peer groups correspond to career stages and overlap with standard  
2 titles. Farber ¶¶ 17-21. The result of the process is recommendations as to every employee's  
3 performance review score, pay, and promotion. Ritchie Tr. 136:25-137:4; 228:25-229:25. The  
4 process was developed by, and is administered by, Microsoft's HR team in Redmond, headed by  
5 J. Ritchie. Ritchie Tr. at 42:17-43:7. The discussions, their inputs, and the process for arriving  
6 at their outcomes, were not consistently recorded. Ritchie Tr. 129:8-130:18; 133:19-134:11;  
7 149:6-13.

8 Plaintiffs' expert in Organizational Psychology, Dr. Ryan, explains that problems with  
9 the process itself, as well as with the inputs to the process, undermine its reliability. Ryan, ¶ 25.  
10 First, regarding the process itself, Dr. Ryan found a lack of standardization in the types of  
11 information serving as inputs into compensation and promotion decisions, as well as in the  
12 specific procedures for discussing and making compensation and promotion decisions. *Id.*, ¶¶32-  
13 39. For example, the meetings were inconsistent in terms of whether direct supervisors attended,  
14 how it was determined which employees were compared to each other, and what information  
15 was available when recommendations were made. *Id.*, ¶¶ 35-36, 39, & n.30.

16 Next, regarding the inputs to the process, Dr. Ryan found that decision makers were able  
17 to apply variable standards in making compensation and promotion decisions, because Microsoft  
18 did not prescribe weights to the underlying criteria. Ryan, ¶¶ 26-31. Thus, evaluators were free  
19 to weight criteria for pay and promotions in ways not aligned with job requirements. *Id.* Indeed,  
20 Dr. Ryan found that promotion decisions are not adequately linked to what Microsoft has stated  
21 are the job requirements in the Career Stage Profiles, so that there is no evidence that managers  
22 made decisions based on job related information. *Id.*, ¶¶ 17-24. Job performance, as measured  
23 by Microsoft's performance review process, likewise does not explain pay and promotion  
24 decisions. Farber ¶ 57.

25  
26 <sup>11</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00002269 at 2276.

1 Finally, Dr. Ryan notes that Microsoft does not adequately train managers or monitor to  
 2 ensure the reliability and validity of outcomes in the Calibration Process. Ryan, ¶¶ 40-42. The  
 3 training that is available to managers on these decisions does not provide instruction on how to  
 4 weigh criteria in relation to the job requirements. *Id.*, ¶ 43. And Microsoft does not take steps to  
 5 test inter-rater reliability, or whether manager decisions are *appropriately* calibrated such that  
 6 managers apply the same standards consistently with each other. *Id.*

7 Dr. Ryan concludes that, “[o]verall, there is no evidence that compensation and  
 8 promotion decisions are made reliably, and in fact, the processes contain numerous critical  
 9 defects.” Ryan, ¶ 37.

### 10 3. Microsoft Pays Women Less Than Men for Substantially Similar 11 Work.

12 Compensation at Microsoft is determined as part of the Calibration Process. The data  
 13 show that men and women perform equally well at Microsoft—that is, men’s and women’s  
 14 performance review scores are roughly equal. Farber ¶ 57. Yet women are consistently paid  
 15 substantially less than men in the same job title and with the same performance. Farber ¶ 5 &  
 16 Table 3.

17 Dr. Farber’s pay regression controls for certain employee characteristics in order to  
 18 compare employees who are similar to one another in relevant ways. His model controls for  
 19 Profession, Discipline, Standard Title, age,<sup>12</sup> tenure,<sup>13</sup> year, and location.<sup>14</sup> Farber ¶¶ 53-56 &  
 20 Table 3. The regression analysis shows that women are paid less than men, to a statistically  
 21 significant level of 21.7 standard deviations. *Id.* This finding well exceeds the threshold of 1.96  
 22 standard deviations to establish statistical significance that courts routinely accept as probative

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
 24 <sup>12</sup> Age is commonly used as a proxy for prior work experience where, as here, the employer’s  
 25 data does not contain information about employees’ prior work experience. Farber ¶ 45.

<sup>13</sup> Tenure is equivalent to years of experience at Microsoft. Farber ¶ 45.

<sup>14</sup> Pay is based in part on geographic location to accommodate cost of living differences within  
 26 the U.S., so Dr. Farber’s model accounts for that as well. Farber ¶ 45.

1 evidence of discrimination.<sup>15</sup> The result is also practically significant given that the class  
 2 shortfall value ranges from approximately \$100 million to \$238 million dollars, depending on  
 3 whether standard title is included. *Id.*, ¶ 80 & Table 8.

4 Microsoft may argue [REDACTED] *see* § II.B.2, *infra*) that  
 5 Dr. Farber’s model is wrong because it does not control for Stock Level. However, Dr. Farber  
 6 explains that it would be inappropriate to control for Stock Level for two reasons. First, stock  
 7 level is a pay band, so regressing compensation based on Stock Level would simply be accepting  
 8 pay as an explanation for pay, which is inappropriate. Farber ¶ 47. In other words, it is  
 9 tautological that the observed gender pay gap would go to zero if stock level is included in the  
 10 model; such an analysis merely confirms that Microsoft adheres to its pay bands and does not  
 11 answer any question relevant to this case. Second, Dr. Farber has found that women are  
 12 systematically assigned to lower Stock Levels than similar men; thus, controlling for Stock Level  
 13 would lead one to underestimate the true pay gap. *Id.*, ¶¶ 48, 56 & Figure 3. In fact, in response  
 14 to Microsoft’s publication of two equal pay studies that controlled for Stock Level, over 30  
 15 employees wrote to HR that controlling for Stock Level was a mistake. The employees noted  
 16 that Stock Level is nothing more than a pay band, and that women receive lower pay (lower  
 17 Stock Levels) than males in their peer group and are not promoted into higher Stock Levels at  
 18 the same rate as men. *See* note 32 *infra*. In fact, Dr. Farber’s model is overly conservative in

19 <sup>15</sup> *Bouman v. Block*, 940 F.2d 1211, 1225 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (accepting significance at the 5%  
 20 probability level as probative of discrimination); *Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties J.*  
 21 *Apprenticeship & Training Comm.*, 833 F.2d 1334, 1340 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a  
 22 probability level of 4.5%—*i.e.*, below 5%—gave “rise to an inference that the [challenged  
 23 practice] rather than chance [was] responsible for” discrimination against women); *Paige v.*  
 24 *California*, 233 F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “we have relied upon the 1.96  
 25 standard deviation standard”—*i.e.*, a probability level of 5%—in discrimination cases); *Smith v.*  
 26 *Xerox Corp.*, 196 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 1999) (“If an obtained result varies from the expected result  
 by two standard deviations, there is only about a 5% probability that the variance is due to  
 chance. Courts generally consider this level of significance sufficient to warrant an inference of  
 discrimination.”) (internal citations omitted) *overruled on other grounds by Meacham v. Knolls*  
*Atomic Power Lab.*, 461 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2006); *Malave v. Potter*, 320 F.3d 321, 327 (2d  
 Cir. 2003) (same).

1 that it controls for Standard Job title, which overlaps with and bakes in decisions about  
2 employees' Career Stage and Stock Level.<sup>16</sup>

3 The observed gender-based pay differential in Engineering and I/T Operations has  
4 existed across Microsoft locations throughout the United States to a statistically significant  
5 degree throughout the entire class period. Farber Table 3. The proposed Class includes women  
6 in Levels 59-67. While women at Levels 68 (“partner”) and above may experience gender  
7 discrimination in pay, employees at these levels participate in decision making within the  
8 challenged process to an extent that likely would preclude their inclusion in the Class. Moreover,  
9 there are relatively few women in these senior positions.

#### 10 **4. Microsoft Promotes Men Over Similarly-Situated Women.**

11 Like compensation, promotions at Microsoft are determined in the Calibration Process.  
12 Women in Engineering and I/T Operations obtain fewer promotions than men in the same job  
13 and with the same characteristics and performance measures.

14 Dr. Farber's promotion regression (which is a probit model)<sup>17</sup> controls for Profession,  
15 Discipline, Stock Level,<sup>18</sup> age, experience at Microsoft, location, and performance. Dr. Farber  
16 finds that, between 2011-2016 (the last year data was available) women in Engineering and I/T  
17 Operations received approximately 518 fewer promotions than would be expected given their  
18 characteristics other than gender, and that the difference is statistically significant. Farber ¶ 77 &

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 <sup>16</sup> Standard Title is defined by Profession, Discipline and Career Stage Level. Career Stage  
21 Level and Stock Level are intertwined; a Career Stage Level is generally defined as either two or  
22 three Stock Levels within a particular Discipline. Farber ¶ 21. Women are in lower Career  
23 Stages, and in lower Stock Levels within Career Stage. Farber ¶¶ 59-64 & Figures 1-3.

24 <sup>17</sup> A probit model is a form of multivariate analysis that can be used when the object of the study  
25 is an outcome that takes on one of two discrete values—*e.g.*, promoted or not promoted. Dr.  
26 Farber's probit model allows estimation of the difference in probability of promotion between  
men and women. Farber ¶¶ 42-43.

<sup>18</sup> Stock Level is not an appropriate control in the compensation regression for the reasons set  
forth above in Section II.A.3. However, because Microsoft defines a promotion as a move from  
one Stock Level to the next, in order to study advancement from one level to the next, one must  
control for Stock Level in this probit regression. Farber ¶ 68.

1 Table 7. This is a properly specified model that controls for the relevant employee  
2 characteristics present in the data.

3 The proposed Class members with promotion claims include women in Levels 60-64.  
4 While the evidence suggests that women are also under-represented at Levels 65-67 (and  
5 above),<sup>19</sup> the relatively small numbers of women at very senior levels means that even a small  
6 number of promotions can mask unfairness because the feeder pool of women available to be  
7 promoted to the next level is so small.

8 **B. Microsoft Knew That the Calibration Process Disadvantaged Women in Pay**  
9 **and Promotions, But Did Nothing to Fix the Problem.**

10 Microsoft knew from the internal and external sources described below that its  
11 Calibration Process had an adverse impact on women in Engineering and I/T Operations in terms  
12 of both compensation and promotion, but did nothing to remedy the problem.

13 **1. On an Annual Basis, Microsoft Audited Pay and Promotion Decisions**  
14 **for Adverse Impact.**

15 [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED]  
17 [REDACTED]  
18 [REDACTED]  
19 [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED]  
22 [REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED]  
24 [REDACTED]

25 <sup>19</sup> See, e.g., MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00284174 at \_191 (in Windows & Devices group, “L65+  
26 Female representation is 20.6% pts below Overall female”).

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and must be aware the  
disparities in compensation and promotion identified here by Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, it has  
allowed these issues to persist uninterrupted. Further, as described by Dr. Ryan, the non-  
privileged “monitoring” that occurs—in other words, that which is shared with actual decisions-  
makers—is simply HR sitting in on Calibration meetings, and is woefully inadequate. Ryan,  
¶¶ 40-43.

**2. The Federal Government Audited Microsoft’s Data [REDACTED]**

[REDACTED]

<sup>20</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00065719.  
<sup>21</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00801714.  
<sup>22</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00801714 at 0008-9.

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[REDACTED]

<sup>23</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00801714 at 0008.  
<sup>24</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00308243 at 248-49.  
<sup>25</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00802741 at 0001.  
<sup>26</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00801714 at 009.  
<sup>27</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00801714 at 010 (emphasis in the original).  
<sup>28</sup> *Id.*  
<sup>29</sup> *Id.*

1 [REDACTED]  
 2 [REDACTED]  
 3 **3. Employee Responses to Microsoft’s Equal Pay Announcements Gave**  
 4 **Microsoft Notice of Widespread Concerns of Pay and Promotion Bias.**

5 Microsoft received substantial employee reaction to two equal pay announcements during  
 6 the class period. First, after CEO Satya Nadella made headlines for statements he made at the  
 7 2014 Grace Hopper Institute (women in technology conference) about equal pay being a function  
 8 of “karma”,<sup>30</sup> he sent a clarifying email to employees claiming that “the overall differences in  
 9 base pay among genders and races (when we consider level and job title) is consistently within  
 10 0.5% at Microsoft.” MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00017963. In response, employees swamped  
 11 Microsoft’s leadership team and HR with messages telling the company that analyzing pay by  
 12 Stock Level is a logical fallacy, because Stock Level is nothing more than a pay band, and  
 13 women are systematically paid less than male peers in the same jobs consistent with their lower  
 14 pay bands (Stock Levels). For example, one manager wrote, “The logic seems to be that men  
 15 and women in the same pay grade receive roughly the same pay. This is not evidence of equal  
 16 pay, but rather that Microsoft enforces an even compa ratio<sup>31</sup> among men and women employees.  
 17 As a manager with direct reports who might ask me whether or not I can provide any evidence  
 18 that our pay system is fair, this doesn’t pass the giggle test.” MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00563277.  
 19 Another employee wrote: “I disagree with the stats on equal pay. When people are not promoted  
 20 at the same rate as their peers, the fact that they are paid on par within their level hides the facts

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
 22 <sup>30</sup> Satya Nadella responded to a question on what advice he would offer women who are not  
 23 comfortable asking for pay raises: “It’s not about asking for the raise, but knowing and having  
 24 faith that the system will actually give you the right raises as you go along. . . . And that, I think  
 25 might be one of the additional superpowers that quite frankly women who don’t ask for a raise  
 26 have. Because that’s good karma.” See <https://news.microsoft.com/2014/10/09/satya-nadella-email-to-employees-re-grace-hopper-conference/>.

<sup>31</sup> A compa ratio is “the result of dividing a person’s base pay rate [] by the midpoint of their salary range,” which is used to determine whether someone is paid at the low, middle, or high end of their Stock Level range. Ritchie Tr. at 393:24-394:11.

1 that they are not paid equally. If I'm doing the exact same job but am at a different level, that's  
 2 not pay equality." MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00150735 at 739. Other comments reflected similar  
 3 feedback.<sup>32</sup>

4 The response was the same when Microsoft released the results of its April 2016 Equal  
 5 Pay Study. The study was undertaken in response to pressure from shareholder Arjuna Capital,  
 6 which threatened Microsoft (and other technology companies) with a shareholder resolution  
 7 forcing it to disclose pay data. Microsoft decided to make a large public announcement about its  
 8 pay data in April 2016 "to preempt[] the investment firm" and "get[] credit for the good deeds."  
 9 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00592294. Unfortunately, again Microsoft simply asserted that women  
 10 earn 99.9 cents to men's dollar when comparing employees in the same job title and Stock  
 11 Level.<sup>33</sup> Once again, employees were quick to respond that the study ignored Microsoft's actual  
 12 problems: gender bias in pay across job peer group (leveling) and promotion velocity.<sup>34</sup> As one

13 <sup>32</sup> See, e.g., MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00562093. ("It is vital that when discussing the pay gap, we  
 14 don't simply say 'both genders at the same level are marking the same pay' and instead ask 'are  
 15 the genders appropriately leveled?"); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00231183 ("But there is no check  
 16 on promotions. We should put something into the system that does another check by HR to  
 17 ensure this is the case. We could create a separate metric on promotions of woman (and  
 18 minorities) to be sure we are driving toward it."); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00150735 at  
 19 739("Have we looked at the data, though, to see if there is a 'promotion gap' between genders?  
 20 That is, how long does a man stay in a role without being promoted versus how long a woman  
 21 stays in the same role before being promoted? Or whether women and men with the same  
 22 number of years' experience come in to Microsoft at different grade levels?").

19 <sup>33</sup> Kathleen Hogan, Ensuring equal pay for equal work, Official Microsoft Blog (Apr. 11, 2016),  
 20 <https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/04/11/ensuring-equal-pay-equal-work/>.

20 <sup>34</sup> These responses are too numerous to catalog here; they are listed in a chart at Shaver Decl., Ex  
 21 B for the Court's reference. Some representative examples include:

22 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00744109 at 109-110 ("[T]his report made me feel that Microsoft is not  
 23 actually committed to diversity, but rather the appearance of diversity. . . . I think the more  
 24 interesting data are the promotion numbers. . . . [I]t is clear that women have much lower levels  
 25 than men, and are not in leadership positions. . . . I'm very disappointed that the head of HR, a  
 26 woman herself, would publish a report like this, without even including a caveat about  
 promotions."); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00743994 ("I'm not at all surprised that the pay  
 difference for different groups in the same level and title is so small. It's comparatively  
 straightforward to make sure that a female L60 PM earns the same as a male L60 PM. What I've  
 experienced firsthand and among female friends of mine is that promotion velocity for male

*Footnote continued on next page*

1 General Manager succinctly put it, “Comparison only of pay at the same level was a big miss.  
 2 It’s all about 1) are similar roles/responsibilities leveled [paid] the same between men and  
 3 women and also 2) is the promo timeline [the] same for men and women.”<sup>35</sup> Dozens of  
 4 employees stressed the sentiments that “[t]here is an important distinction between equal pay for  
 5 equal level, and equal pay for equal work. The latter presupposes women are appropriately  
 6 leveled, and numbers suggest this is not the case at Microsoft,”<sup>36</sup> and “[t]he statistics . . . about  
 7 equal pay for people at the same level and title aren’t really convincing . . . . Correct me if I am  
 8 wrong, but the pay is mostly based on a function of someone’s level. . . . [I]t is really promotion  
 9 velocity that indicates whether we are truly rewarding different groups equally for their equal  
 10 work.”<sup>37</sup> One manager even pointed out to HR leaders that Microsoft was repeating the same  
 11 mistake as it had in the prior equal pay announcement, and that Microsoft was still refusing to  
 12 answer the relevant questions which it had the data to measure: promotion velocity and bias  
 13 across peer group due to pay level. MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00703435. Another manager noted  
 14 that “he has been deluged by women here at the company asking him to unpack today’s news.  
 15 He said ‘already a bunch of women’ have been pinging him to find out if we’ve done a pay data  
 16 comparison between different levels, and is the news bad or did we just not bother to do it.”<sup>38</sup>  
 17 Finally, an email chain from a group of Microsoft Partner-level technical women (“A Life  
 18 Without Lines”), stated that it was more of the same “vanity metrics” seen after the Grace

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
 20 *Footnote continued from previous page*

21 versus female employees is different. My observation is that it’s harder for a woman to get  
 22 promoted at Microsoft than it is for a man.”); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00744097 at 098 (“I think  
 23 it’s virtually meaningless that people in the same level with the same job title have nearly equal  
 24 salaries. The real disparities, as we know, are in hiring, promotion, leadership positions, and  
 25 representation in non-traditional roles . . . . [W]omen and non-whites are clearly  
 26 underrepresented in tech and leadership roles . . . seems disingenuous to slice the report in such a  
 way that it looks like we are already at equality.”).

<sup>35</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00775226 at \_227.

<sup>36</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00705352 at 353.

<sup>37</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00744107.

<sup>38</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00806770.

1 Hopper fiasco, and “I’m surprised to see us proudly releasing these figures again. Of course we  
2 make sure not to underpay women and [minorities] at a given level. The much more insidious  
3 problem is promotion velocity.”<sup>39</sup>

4 Microsoft’s HR and Communications departments discussed how to respond to all of  
5 these employee comments. Specifically, as to the frequently raised question of whether  
6 Microsoft had looked at and would release promotion data, Kathleen Hogan, head of HR,  
7 acknowledged that, “This is the tough question.” MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00744230 at 231  
8 (emphasis added). But rather than actually answer the question (or address the underlying issue),  
9 Microsoft developed a canned response to evade the issue, refusing to acknowledge that it had  
10 studied this issue or to report the results. *Id.* at 230.<sup>40</sup>

11 Microsoft was well aware of the persistent gender-based pay and promotion disparities  
12 from its own internal audits. Instead of being candid with its employees, investors, and the  
13 public, Microsoft cooked the analysis by adding stock level—*i.e.*, a pay band—to claim success.  
14 Many of its own employees knew the truth: the pay studies were a sham.

15 **4. Knowledge of Gender Bias Went to the Very Top of Microsoft.**

16 Microsoft’s leadership Senior Leadership Team (SLT), which consists of CEO Satya  
17 Nadella and the Executive Vice Presidents (“EVPs”) who report to him, routinely observed  
18 gender bias and culture problems at Microsoft. In Mr. Nadella’s company email clarifying his

19 <sup>39</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00797920 at 922-923 (“The question here is not whether two people  
20 of different gender are at the same level are paid equally. The question really is whether two  
21 people of different genders with equal performance are recognized to be the same level this is  
22 where length in level/promo velocity is the more relevant measurement.”) (“This data would be  
23 more meaningful to me if they not only looked at equivalent levels but also other measures like  
24 equivalent experience and education to make sure women and men were being leveled the same.  
25 Otherwise where people are in level (through hiring and promotion) could be indicative of a bias  
26 . . . basically a circular reference on our own practices.”).

<sup>40</sup> *See, e.g.*, MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00784718; MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00705901 at \_902;  
MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00592294; MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00714794;  
MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00744437. Microsoft has also refused to provide its promotion velocity  
data to third parties performing research into how women fare at various technology companies.  
MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00418344.

1 statements at the 2014 Grace Hopper Institute, Mr. Nadella acknowledged three areas in which  
2 Microsoft needed to make progress: 1) “we must ensure not only that everyone receives equal  
3 pay for equal work, but that they have the opportunity to do equal work”; 2) “we need to recruit  
4 more diverse talent to Microsoft at all levels ... These numbers are not good enough ... and  
5 especially in engineering”; and 3) “we need to expand training for all employees on how to foster  
6 an inclusive culture.”<sup>41</sup> Mr. Nadella has stressed that “equal opportunity for equal work ... is  
7 where [Microsoft] need[s] to do the hard work to bring in and promote into senior ranks more  
8 people representing all diverse groups.”<sup>42</sup> [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED]  
13 This has not generated appropriate interventions to address known problems. For example, the  
14 [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]  
17 [REDACTED]  
18 [REDACTED]  
19 [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED]  
22 [REDACTED]

23 <sup>41</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00017963.

24 <sup>42</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00563277.

24 <sup>43</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00678321 at 326.

25 <sup>44</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00825924 at 928; *see also id.* at 925 ([REDACTED])  
26 [REDACTED]

1 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00278390 at p. 8. Other records similarly reflect that knowledge of  
2 Microsoft’s institutional biases and the way the company masks them went to the very top of the  
3 organization. For example, outside consultant Sunergos held focus groups with technical women  
4 at the company and reported back to HR EVP Kathleen Hogan on the common themes that  
5 emerged, including:

- 6 • Being overlooked, not listened to. Hard to speak, so outnumbered in this  
7 environment;
- 8 • Women leaders are almost invisible here;
- 9 • I don’t want to be treated differently. First it seems like I have to work  
10 harder to get here and then to have others think I am here because I am a  
11 woman, that is a double whammy;
- 12 • Insensitivity and lack of awareness of women’s issues. For example,  
13 asking ‘how was your vacation?’ when coming back from maternity leave;
- 14 • Advice to other women at Microsoft: Don’t talk about your children.

15 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00677331 at pp. 16, 19, 24, 25, 34. In another example, in June 2015,  
16 the [REDACTED] had a Q&A with the [REDACTED]  
17 An attendee asked, “Can you address the gender pay gap?” [REDACTED]  
18 [REDACTED], responded: “I think it is more about promo velocity than actual pay  
19 gap, because every level has clear pay boundaries.”<sup>45</sup>

20 In sum, Microsoft’s senior leadership knew from multiple sources that it had a pay and  
21 promotion problem, but failed to remedy the systemic bias against women as [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED] MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00278390  
23 at p. 8.

24  
25 <sup>45</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00022538 at 540. *See also* MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00201435 (email  
26 to HR manager: “overall themes determined based on the data we looked at” include “males are promoted faster than females,” and “females are in level longer than males”).

1           **C. Microsoft Has Ignored Overwhelming Evidence of Intentional Gender**  
 2           **Discrimination and Maintained a Company Culture Biased Against Women.**

3           Microsoft’s discriminatory processes do not operate in a vacuum, but instead are shaped  
 4 by a common culture of gender stereotyping and bias against women at the company. The  
 5 evidence of intentional discrimination is substantial, from many different sources, which  
 6 separately and collectively show Microsoft’s pattern and practice of gender bias and bring “the  
 7 cold numbers convincingly to life.” *Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States*, 431 U.S. 324, 339  
 8 (1977). This evidence includes internal complaints by female employees submitted to  
 9 Microsoft’s Employee Relations Investigations Team (“ERIT”), comments made by employees  
 10 in the Microsoft Poll Survey, civil lawsuits and gender discrimination charges filed against  
 11 Microsoft with governmental agencies, and documentary evidence such as corporate emails and  
 12 records reflecting persistent biases and systemic problems for women.

13           This constellation of evidence reflects the following themes: 1) an exclusionary “boys  
 14 club” atmosphere; 2) a culture rife with sexual harassment; 3) a near-total failure of HR to  
 15 properly investigate and redress employee complaints of discrimination and harassment; and 4)  
 16 acknowledgment that Microsoft’s diversity and inclusion (D&I) initiatives are mere window-  
 17 dressing and have failed to address the underlying problems. This common, classwide evidence  
 18 shows that Microsoft “operated under a general policy of discrimination.” *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at  
 19 353.

20           **1. Microsoft Maintains an Exclusionary “Boy’s Club” Atmosphere.**

21           Like every other large company in the United States, Microsoft has a written policy  
 22 against gender discrimination and sexual harassment. Microsoft does not follow its policy.

23           Microsoft women have reported to senior leadership that Microsoft maintains an abusive,  
 24 toxic, “boy’s club” atmosphere, where women are ignored, abused, or degraded. *See, e.g.,*  
 25 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00792417 at 419 (██████████) “I will not be able to  
 26

1 recommend MS to other female engineers. The main reason is that MS culture accepts and  
 2 tolerates abuse and toxic behavior, especially towards females.”);  
 3 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00708659 at 661 (Email to Kathleen Hogan, EVP: “In an Engineering  
 4 role, I am surrounded by men and only men in most of my meetings. . . .The good ol boy culture  
 5 and way of behaving at meetings is alive and well.”); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00371657 at 658-  
 6 59(Email to [REDACTED] “Our organization is actually empowering a culture  
 7 of exclusion. We have [REDACTED] women in [REDACTED] within my group . . .There are  
 8 undeniable differences in the level of support, professional growth opportunities and assigned  
 9 project tasks for male peers with similar experience and qualifications.”);  
 10 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00561670 at 562752 ([REDACTED]: “It is  
 11 hard to believe behavior like this, especially by a [REDACTED], would be tolerated at Microsoft.  
 12 . . . The behavior I am referring to ranges from a development project code named ‘Wrecking  
 13 Ball’ after Miley Cyrus’ provocative video, to a hostile t-shirt graphic depicting [REDACTED]  
 14 [REDACTED] an email titled ‘Working Backwards’ that stereotypes and degrades women, employees  
 15 being called pussy, cunt, and Steve Ballmer being referred to as our limp dick CEO. This  
 16 cultural backdrop has had a real effect on me. I consider myself to be a strong person. I have a  
 17 strong track record of performance over a long tenure. I should not feel powerless. But I do.  
 18 Completely. Powerless.”); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00677331 at p.16 (“The ‘bro culture’ is the  
 19 natural comradery that the men have. Not always easy or natural for women to fit in to this.”).<sup>46</sup>

20  
 21 <sup>46</sup> See also Boeh Decl., ¶ 7 (culture is “unfriendly toward women”); Dove Decl., ¶ 7 (“Women  
 22 and their perspectives are undervalued at Microsoft. On many occasions I have experienced or  
 23 witnessed women being cut off in meetings, excluded from meetings, and our opinions dismissed  
 24 or undervalued.”); Muenchow Decl., ¶ 6 (“Women are held to a different standard than men:  
 25 when they speak up in meetings, they receive negative criticism for being too aggressive, but  
 26 men routinely talk over women without criticism.”); Moussouris Decl., ¶ 6 (“Women were  
 frequently interrupted or talked over at meetings. I saw on several occasions that women who  
 shared their ideas were ignored, but that the same or similar ideas later presented by men would  
 be acknowledged and congratulated.”); Smith Decl., ¶ 7 (“The men I worked with created a  
 ‘good ol’ boy’s club’ atmosphere, where the men often socialized and drank together. As a

*Footnote continued on next page*

1 [REDACTED]  
 2 [REDACTED]  
 3 [REDACTED]  
 4 [REDACTED]

5 Even Microsoft's Unconscious Bias training is prey to the culture of bias and  
 6 stereotyping that it purports to correct. One attendee wrote: "In spite of this being a course about  
 7 unconscious bias, the facilitator tended to ignore or pass over the less outspoken women in the  
 8 audience in favor of the louder voices. In particular, one woman was given a microphone and  
 9 assured she could speak next. At least 15 minutes later, the facilitator still had not acknowledged  
 10 the woman with the microphone and encouraged several men who just jumped in and spoke out  
 11 of turn." MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00166305 at 307-308. *See also*  
 12 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00371657 ("The unconscious bias training has not made any notable  
 13 difference."); Muenchow Decl., ¶ 7 (same).

14 **2. Microsoft's Culture is Rife With Sexual Harassment.**

15 Company records indicate that women at Microsoft are sexualized by their male  
 16 managers and coworkers, leading to a substantial number of incidents of alleged sexual  
 17 harassment, and even several incidents of sexual assault, that often go unpunished. In files  
 18

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
 20 *Footnote continued from previous page*

21 woman, I felt objectified and excluded."); Sowinska Decl., ¶ 7 ("I frequently heard stories, and  
 22 shared my own experiences, regarding women's contributions being undervalued and women  
 23 being denied professional development opportunities. . . . I also spoke with women about the  
 24 pressure we felt to hit the sweet spot between being perceived as 'too timid' or 'overly  
 25 passionate' and 'too harsh' in Microsoft's male dominated culture."); Underwood Decl., ¶ 6 ("I  
 26 was marginalized, excluded, denied resources, and treated differently than my male peers.");  
 Vaughn Decl., ¶ 6 ("I am often excluded from meetings I should attend, and more senior male  
 employees refuse to respond to my correspondence."); Warren Decl., ¶ 7 ("[M]en are praised for  
 exhibiting strong opinions and being assertive, while women are admonished for the same  
 behavior.").

<sup>47</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00341320 at 321.

1 produced for the period 2010-2016, there have been at least 108 *reported* incidents of sexual  
2 harassment and assault alleged by women in US-based technical jobs at Microsoft.<sup>48</sup>

3 Such incidents were often tied to Microsoft work trainings, *see e.g.*,  
4 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00819252 at 257-258 (female employee sexually harassed by *three*  
5 different male employees at a Microsoft training), or work social events, which should have been  
6 important professional networking and development opportunities, but instead were threatening  
7 environments for many Microsoft women. *See e.g.*, MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00816432 (*four*  
8 women raised separate complaints of sexual harassment against one male employee occurring at  
9 a single work social event); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00809046 at 048 (intoxicated male  
10 Microsoft employee pulled down the shirt of a female employee at a company function and as a  
11 result the female employee left her role); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00818175 (male employee  
12 repeatedly touched leg of female employee during a meal with all Microsoft employees  
13 following the [REDACTED]); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00809106 at p. 8 (female  
14 employee groped and sexually harassed by male employee at team happy hour);  
15 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00809030 (female employee groped by a male employee at [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED]); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00631799 (four women groped and sexually  
17 harassed by male employee at several work-related functions);  
18 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00814864 at 866 (female employee groped by male employee multiple  
19 times at company event). *See also* Boeh Decl., ¶ 7 (“I was sexually harassed by a co-worker. I  
20 sought advice from [HR] regarding the situation, but HR failed to address the harassment while  
21 increasing the pain and stress of my situation.”); Miller Decl., ¶ 8 (“[My manager] would  
22 regularly make inappropriate comments about what I was wearing, and would touch me and ask  
23 why I was not married.”); Moussouris Decl., ¶ 7 (male manager found to have sexually harassed  
24 his female reports, yet he was simply transferred to another group and eventually promoted);

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>48</sup> The two Employee Relations Investigations Team complaint logs produced by Microsoft are  
attached to the Shaver Declaration as Exhibit C.

1 Smith Decl., ¶ 7 (“[M]ale co-workers frequently commented on my looks and figure and made  
2 inappropriate comments about other women’s looks. These comments occurred nearly  
3 constantly, even on conference calls before meetings began.”); Sowinska Decl., ¶ 7 (describing  
4 frequent incidents of sexual harassment and strategizing with another manager “regarding his  
5 concerns about sending a female employee to meetings with senior IT employees who failed to  
6 pay attention to her and obviously stared at her breasts”); Warren Decl., ¶ 7 (“Microsoft’s Xbox  
7 team hosted a party in spring of 2015 that included scantily clad women dancing on tables,  
8 which was widely praised by the men in my office.”).

9 Even more disturbingly, in the same time period, at least three women reported sexual  
10 assault or rape by male Microsoft co-workers. *See e.g.*, MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00064984 at  
11 985 (female Microsoft intern raped by male Microsoft intern, reported rape to supervisor and  
12 HR, and yet forced to work alongside her accused rapist; when victim told HR she was  
13 considering obtaining a restraining order she was informed she would be moved off the team if  
14 she did so; accused rapist offered fulltime employment at Microsoft);  
15 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00646449 at p. 5 (female ██████████ told HR  
16 Manager that she and another female Microsoft employee were raped by a male ██████████  
17 ██████████); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00632500 at 527-528 (female Microsoft  
18 employee reported to Microsoft Global Security that another female Microsoft employee was  
19 sexually assaulted by a male Microsoft employee on a business trip and there may have been  
20 three additional victims). The flagrant and repeated incidents of sexual misconduct toward  
21 women at Microsoft reflects the corporate culture in which women are undervalued and  
22 underpaid.

23 **3. Microsoft Does Not Appropriately Investigate or Redress Employee**  
24 **Complaints of Discrimination and Harassment.**

25 As described above, from 2010 to 2016, Microsoft received 108 complaints of sexual  
26 harassment from female US-based technical employees. During this time, women in US-based

1 technical jobs at Microsoft also lodged 119 complaints of gender discrimination, 8 complaints of  
 2 retaliation, and 3 complaints of pregnancy discrimination.<sup>49</sup> While 238 complaints lodged with  
 3 HR by professional women making careers at a Fortune 50 company is shocking enough, what is  
 4 even more disappointing is the lackluster response to the issues raised by the Microsoft team  
 5 (“ERIT”) tasked with investigating complaints of Microsoft’s anti-discrimination and anti-  
 6 harassment policy. For example, of the 118 complaints of gender discrimination, ERIT only  
 7 **once** concluded that a complaint of gender discrimination was “founded.”<sup>50</sup> Indeed, ERIT is  
 8 notorious among Microsoft employees for “rubber-stamping” management, and employees have  
 9 “little faith” in the investigations. *See e.g.*, MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00064978 at 79 (“if handled  
 10 internally by Microsoft, [it] could only be expected to lead to another finding of ‘unfounded’, no  
 11 matter how obvious the evidence ... we already know of Microsoft’s history of making a  
 12 determination of ‘unfounded’ even when evidence of wrongdoing has been provided in the  
 13 investigations.”).<sup>51</sup>

14 \_\_\_\_\_  
 15 <sup>49</sup> Shaver Decl., Ex. C.

16 <sup>50</sup> Shaver Decl., Ex. C.

17 <sup>51</sup> *See also* Alberts Decl., ¶ 8 (“I have no idea whether HR investigated my complaint, as HR  
 18 never followed up. I believe that complaining to HR can be career-ending at Microsoft and I only  
 19 did so because I saw no other option short of leaving the company, which I did when HR did  
 20 nothing.”); Boeh Decl., ¶ 5,8 (HR ignored multiple complaints of discrimination, including when  
 21 manager explicitly stated he denied her a promotion because he did not want to waste it on  
 22 someone who might become pregnant); Dove Decl., ¶ 9 (ERIT found no violation after  
 23 complaint of gender discrimination and told her it was technically impossible to remove unfair  
 24 comments from her performance review; “This is not plausible at a tech company.”); Hutson  
 25 Decl., ¶ 6 (for first complaint, “HR never followed up with me”; for second complaint, “despite  
 26 telling me that my manager acted inappropriately, ERIT found no violation”); Miller Decl., ¶ 9  
 (complaining to HR “will not make any difference and will only subject the complainants to  
 hostility and retaliation”); Muenchow Decl., ¶ 7 (“[M]aking complaints about discrimination to  
 Microsoft’s [HR] department does not make any difference.”); Moussouris Decl., ¶ 7 (HR took  
 no action on multiple complaints of discrimination and retaliation); Smith Decl., ¶ 9 (“HR sent a  
 single email to my work email while I was out of the office and never attempted to reach me  
 again, even after I followed up with them upon my return.”); Underwood Decl., ¶ 9 (“ERIT  
 collected information from me, but I did not see them take any action to address the  
 discrimination. The multiple complaints I made did nothing to improve the hostility I and other  
 women faced.”); Vaughn Decl., ¶ 7 (After complaining that male co-workers with less

1 In fact, ERIT often concludes there is no policy violation even when all the evidence  
2 points to the contrary. For example, four female employees raised separate complaints of sexual  
3 harassment against a male employee at a Microsoft event, yet ERIT found no policy violation  
4 despite concluding that the accused harasser touched all four women in a manner that made them  
5 feel uncomfortable.<sup>52</sup> In another investigation, ERIT concluded that a male employee “engaged  
6 in harassing behavior as described in Microsoft’s Anti-Harassment and Anti-Discrimination  
7 Policy (Sexual Harassment),” yet ERIT still perplexingly found that the behavior did not rise to  
8 the level of a policy violation.<sup>53</sup>

9 The ERIT team, which operates from the Redmond headquarters, also has no policies or  
10 procedures on how to conduct ERIT investigations. *Id.* 157:6-13. For example, ERIT has no  
11 policies or procedures in place to ensure the safety of Microsoft employees when they allege  
12 sexual harassment or assault. *Id.* See, e.g., MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00645459 at p. 2 (two  
13 women raised complaints of sexual harassment against a male employee, but one of them was  
14 subsequently left alone on site with the accused harasser). Also troublingly, ERIT does not  
15 monitor for “repeat-offenders.” De Lanoy Sept. 18, 2017 Tr. 89:24-90:4; 86:25-87:2. While  
16 ERIT maintains a database of investigations, the database does not flag where an accused  
17 appears more than once. *Id.* 90:23-25. A repeat offender would only be identified if an  
18 investigator happened to recall the name from an earlier complaint and then searched the records  
19 for prior ERIT activity. *Id.* 95:17-20 (investigator “*might* look in the database to see if that  
20 person’s name was recorded for any prior ERIT activity ... If their name sounded familiar.”).  
21 However, even if a Microsoft investigator is somehow aware of other complaints against an  
22 accused, this knowledge does not inform Microsoft’s investigation. *Id.* 92:14-24; 94:2-8; 89:4-  
23 14 (to consider repeated gender bias offenses would not be “proper” or “fair”).

24 

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*Footnote continued from previous page*

25 experience were earning more, “HR told me there was nothing they could do.”).

26 <sup>52</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00816432.

<sup>53</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00632037 at 042.

1 Nor does ERIT monitor for retaliation in response to raising a complaint. *Id.* 83:6-20;  
2 85:19-8619, and women at Microsoft “fear reprisals if they openly challenge the gender hostile  
3 culture.”<sup>54</sup> For example, when a female Microsoft employee asserted that her male manager’s  
4 attempts to demote her from [REDACTED] constituted gender discrimination, “her manager cautioned  
5 her that if she makes those claims in writing, she would likely be terminated from Microsoft.”<sup>55</sup>  
6 *See also*, MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00815540 at 542 (after raising sexual harassment complaint  
7 with ERIT and HR, female employee’s [REDACTED] retaliated  
8 against her by scrutinizing her use of work time to attend a training, made negative comments  
9 about her performance, and questioned whether she had a future at Microsoft);  
10 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00815228 at 232 (female employee alleged she was denied a  
11 promotion and received a negative performance review in retaliation for reporting gender  
12 discrimination); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00065680 at 682 (female employee received first  
13 negative performance review in [REDACTED] at Microsoft after complaining about gender  
14 discrimination at a Microsoft women’s event); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00623396 at 398 (female  
15 employee alleged [REDACTED] retaliated against her for raising  
16 a gender discrimination complaint by giving her a negative performance review and removing  
17 her from her role).

18 Finally, in determining what discipline to impose on a founded complaint, Microsoft  
19 defers to business leaders—*i.e.*, “[t]he manager or management of the subject of the  
20 complaint”—rather than Human Resources or Legal for the “final say” in any corrective action.  
21 *Id.* 192:1-3; 193: 11-14. Thus, it is unsurprising that Microsoft employees believe HR and ERIT  
22 defend management,<sup>56</sup> do not follow their own policies or the law, and that ERIT investigations  
23 are a “farce,” “pretextual,” and a “subterfuge”.<sup>57</sup>

24 <sup>54</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00064918 at 929.

25 <sup>55</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00064918 at 930.

26 <sup>56</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00059215 at 217.

<sup>57</sup> MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00865592 at 597.



1 Employees within the D&I department, who are tasked with reporting out progress on  
 2 D&I for their organizations over time, similarly express frustration at the lack of impact their  
 3 programs make. MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00259655 at 656 [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED];  
 5 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00150613 at p.4 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00677712 at 717 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]  
 8 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00441086 at 087 (“we show up poorly”);

9 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00441092 (efforts “simply not enough”);

10 MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00074974 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00074988 (“haven’t made material forward  
 12 progress.”); MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00420916 at 919 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]  
 14 [REDACTED] MSFT\_MOUSSOURIS\_00342925 at 927

15 [REDACTED].  
 16 In sum, Microsoft has long been aware of the gender discrimination against female  
 17 employees, has not remedied the problem, and instead has focused its efforts on misleading  
 18 announcements about pay equity and unproductive D&I initiatives that merely check the box on  
 19 commitment.

### 20 **III. ARGUMENT**

#### 21 **A. Legal Standards**

##### 22 **1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23**

23 The Court may certify a class if the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
 24 23(a) are met, along with one of the prongs of Rule 23(b). *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 344. Although “a  
 25 court’s class-certification analysis must be rigorous and may entail some overlap with the merits  
 26 of the plaintiff’s underlying claim, Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free ranging

1 merits inquiries at the certification stage.” *Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds*, 133  
2 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (2013) (quoting *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 351) (quotation marks omitted). *See*  
3 *also id.* at 1195 (“Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that  
4 they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are  
5 satisfied.”).

6 Here, Plaintiffs seek certification of their claims for injunctive relief under 23(b)(2), for  
7 monetary damages under 23(b)(3), and for liability under 23(b)(2), (b)(3), and/or (c)(4) of the  
8 following class:

9 All women who have worked at Microsoft within the Engineering and/or I/T Operations  
10 Professions in the United States at any time from September 16, 2012 to the present in  
11 Stock Levels 59 to 67, inclusive.

12 As described below, Plaintiffs readily satisfy the standards for certification.

## 13 2. Liability Under Title VII and WLAD

14 To determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met, the Court must first look to  
15 the elements of the underlying substantive claims. *Parsons v. Ryan*, 754 F.3d 657, 676 (9th Cir.  
16 2014); *Stockwell v. City & Cty. of San Francisco*, 749 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 2014). Here,  
17 Plaintiffs bring class claims for disparate impact and disparate treatment under Title VII and  
18 WLAD. The claims under both statutes are co-extensive and Plaintiffs’ arguments herein apply  
19 to both. *Oliver v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co.*, 106 Wash. 2d 675, 678 (1986) (finding that disparate  
20 impact and treatment theories are available under WLAD, and that WLAD “is patterned after  
21 Title VII” and “decisions interpreting the federal act are persuasive authority for the construction  
22 of [WLAD]”). “Generally, litigation of both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims are  
23 divided into two phases: liability and remedial.” *Williams v. Boeing Co.*, 225 F.R.D. 626, 634  
24 (W.D. Wash. 2005).

1                                   **a.        Disparate Impact Liability**

2            “Disparate impact claims assert that the employer has a facially neutral policy or practice  
3 that causes a disparate impact on a protected group, even if the employer has no intent to  
4 discriminate.” *Williams*, 225 F.R.D. at 634 (citation omitted). To establish a prima facie case of  
5 disparate impact, a plaintiff must “identif[y] the specific employment practice that is  
6 challenged,” “show that there are statistical disparities in the employer’s work force,” and the  
7 “statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of  
8 causation.” *Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust*, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988). If the prima  
9 facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to show that its employment practices  
10 are based on legitimate business reasons, and that there was no less discriminatory alternative.  
11 *Id.* at 998; *Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, 285 F.R.D. 492, 505 (2012). This is commonly  
12 referred to as the “liability phase.”

13            If liability is established, the entire class is entitled to a presumption of make whole  
14 relief. *Ellis*, 285 F.R.D. at 505. A class member seeking relief “need only show that he or she  
15 suffered an adverse employment action and therefore was a potential victim of the proved  
16 discrimination. After such a showing, the employer bears the burden of persuading the trier of  
17 fact that its decision was made for lawful reasons; otherwise, the employee is entitled to  
18 individualized relief[.]” *Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.*, 685 F.3d 135, 151 (2d Cir. 2012)  
19 (citations and alterations omitted). This is commonly referred to as the “remedial” or “damages”  
20 phase.

21                                   **b.        Disparate Treatment**

22            Disparate treatment claims arise where the employer “utilizes a pattern or practice of  
23 intentional discrimination” such that it is “the employer’s standard operating procedure.”  
24 *Williams*, 225 F.R.D. at 634. In contrast to disparate impact claims, “disparate treatment does  
25 not require the identification of a specific employment policy responsible for the discrimination.”  
26 *Rollins v. Traylor Bros.*, No. C14-1414 JCC, 2016 WL 258523, at \*7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21,

1 2016) (citing *Brown v. Nucor Corp.*, 785 F.3d 895, 915 (4th Cir. 2015)).<sup>59</sup> It does, however,  
 2 require “significant proof” that Defendants “operated under a general policy of discrimination.”  
 3 *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 353. Significant proof of such a policy can be shown entirely through  
 4 statistics and anecdotal evidence that demonstrate “a pattern of discrimination.” *Rollins*, 2016  
 5 WL 258523, at \*7; *Beck v. Boeing Co.*, 60 F. App’x 38, 39 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating plaintiffs may  
 6 establish prima facie case “through statistics alone”).<sup>60</sup> If the prima facie case is established, the  
 7 burden shifts to the employer to “demonstrate that the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence ‘is either  
 8 inaccurate or insignificant.’” *Id.* (quoting *Teamsters*, 431 U.S. at 360). Whoever prevails on the  
 9 preponderance of the evidence wins the liability phase.

10 If plaintiffs prevail, they are entitled to “a rebuttable inference that all class members  
 11 were victims of the discriminatory practice, [which] will justify ‘an award of prospective relief’  
 12 such as ‘an injunctive order against the continuation of the discriminatory practice.’” *Dukes*, 564  
 13 U.S. at 352 n.7 (quoting *Teamsters*, 431 U.S. at 361). “If individual relief is sought, as it is here,  
 14 “a ‘district court must usually conduct additional proceedings to determine the scope of  
 15 individual relief.’ At this phase, the burden of proof will shift to the company, but it will have the  
 16 right to raise any individual affirmative defenses it may have, and to ‘demonstrate that the  
 17 individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons.’” *Id.* (quoting  
 18 *Teamsters*, 431 U.S. at 361-62). This is the “damages phase” in the disparate treatment case.

19 **B. Plaintiffs’ Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Claims Satisfy Rule**  
 20 **23(a).**

21 Rule 23(a) requires that: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is  
 22 impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or  
 23

24 <sup>59</sup> *Rollins* was subsequently decertified for failure to satisfy the numerosity requirement. 2016  
 WL 5942943 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2016).

25 <sup>60</sup> See also *Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States*, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (“Where gross  
 26 statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof  
 of a pattern or practice of discrimination.”).

1 defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4)  
 2 the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R.  
 3 Civ. P. 23(a). Together, these requirements seek to “limit the class claims to those fairly  
 4 encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.” *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 349.

5 **1. The Class Is Sufficiently Numerous.**

6 While there is no threshold number of class members required, “[g]enerally, 40 or more  
 7 members will satisfy the numerosity requirement.” *Dunakin v. Quigley*, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1297,  
 8 1326-27 (W.D. Wash. 2015). The question is whether joinder of all potential plaintiffs would be  
 9 impracticable. *Id.* Here, there are approximately 8,630 proposed Class members, readily  
 10 satisfying this requirement. Farber ¶ 11.

11 **2. There Are Common Questions of Law and Fact That Will Drive the**  
 12 **Resolution of Plaintiffs’ Claims.**

13 To satisfy commonality, class members’ claims must share common questions of fact or  
 14 law that are “capable of class wide resolution.” *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 350. A contention is capable  
 15 of classwide resolution if “the determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is  
 16 central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” *Id.* Commonality poses a “limited  
 17 burden” because it “only requires a single significant question of law or fact.” *Mazza v. Am.*  
 18 *Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, 666 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2012).

19 **a. Disparate Impact Commonality**

20 Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim raises the common questions of whether Microsoft’s  
 21 Calibration process has a disparate impact on women in pay and promotions. These questions  
 22 are capable of class wide resolution because a determination—yes or no—will establish whether  
 23 plaintiffs have met their prima facie case of disparate impact. If they have, two other significant  
 24 common questions arise: whether the practice is based on business necessity and whether there is  
 25 a less discriminatory alternative. Together, the answers to these common questions will establish  
 26 or defeat liability for the Class.

1 As other courts have held, commonality is easily satisfied in these circumstances. For  
2 instance, in *Ellis*, the plaintiffs challenged “specific employment practices within Costco’s  
3 promotion system,” such as a tap-on-the-shoulder appointment process, a lack of posting for  
4 open positions, and reliance on common but unvalidated criteria for assessing candidates. 285  
5 F.R.D. at 531. The court held that, “Plaintiffs’ argument—that such companywide practices lead  
6 to disparate outcomes—is a common question subject to classwide proof and rebuttal.” *Id.*  
7 Similarly, in *McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.*, 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.  
8 2012), the plaintiffs alleged that their employer’s teaming and account distribution policies  
9 caused an adverse impact on African American brokers. The court found that, “whether [the  
10 teaming policy] causes racial discrimination and whether it nonetheless is justified by business  
11 necessity are issues common to the entire class and therefore appropriate for class-wide  
12 determination. And likewise with regard to account distributions.” *Id.* at 489. *See also Parra v*  
13 *Bashas’, Inc.*, 291 F.R.D. 360, 375 (D. Ariz. 2014) (where, like here, company used common  
14 pay scales to vary pay for white employees versus comparable Hispanic employees causing  
15 disparate impact on Hispanic employees, commonality satisfied because “if a trier of fact finds  
16 that Bashas’ wage scales lead to disparate outcomes, that is a common question subject to  
17 classwide proof and rebuttal”) (citing *Ellis*, 285 F.R.D. at 531). As these authorities make clear,  
18 Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims raise common questions that will “generate common *answers*  
19 apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 350.

20 **b. Disparate Treatment Commonality**

21 Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim raises the common question of whether  
22 discrimination was Microsoft’s “standard operating procedure,” to be shown through “significant  
23 proof” that Microsoft “operated under a general policy of discrimination.” *Dukes*, 131 S. Ct. at  
24 2553. This question is capable of class wide resolution because its determination—yes or no—  
25 will establish whether plaintiffs have met their prima facie case of disparate treatment. If they  
26 have, another significant common question arises: whether Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence “is

1 either inaccurate or insignificant.” *Beck*, 60 F. App’x at 39. Together, the answers to these  
 2 common questions will establish or defeat liability for the Class.

3 Here, Plaintiffs’ evidence of a general policy of discrimination is substantial, including:  
 4 1) statistically significant evidence of discrimination in the common Calibration process; 2)  
 5 evidence that Microsoft’s senior leadership knew of the pay and promotion disparities and yet  
 6 did not fix the problem; and 3) evidence that Microsoft has a corporate culture hostile to women,  
 7 and that the HR organizations tasked with investigating and curbing discrimination failed at both.

8 Other courts have relied on the same categories of evidence to support a finding of  
 9 commonality for a disparate treatment claim. *See, e.g., Ellis*, 285 F.R.D. at 510-531 (finding  
 10 commonality satisfied with “significant proof that the entire class was subject to the same  
 11 allegedly discriminatory practices,” falling into three categories: common promotions practices  
 12 relying on common criteria, a companywide culture, and statistical evidence of gender  
 13 disparities); *Rollins*, 2016 WL 258523 at \*7-10 (finding commonality satisfied by substantial  
 14 anecdotal evidence of discrimination in the workplace and statistical evidence of racial  
 15 disparities); *Brown v. Nucor Corp.*, 785 F.3d 895, 914 (4th Cir. 2015) (same) (“[T]he workers’  
 16 statistical and anecdotal evidence, especially when combined, thus provide precisely the ‘glue’ of  
 17 commonality that *Wal-Mart* demands.”); *Beck v. Boeing*, 203 F.R.D. 459, 464 (W.D. Wash.  
 18 2001) (“[S]tatistically significant results of adverse impacts on female employees in every  
 19 facility and at every level within the Puget Sound area [] establishes sufficient indicia of class-  
 20 wide disparate treatment to satisfy the certification criteria of commonality and typicality.”),  
 21 *vacated in part on other grounds*, 60 F. App’x 38 (9th Cir. 2003). The evidence proffered here is  
 22 on par with or more substantial than these and other cases finding commonality.

23 **3. The Representative Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Class**  
 24 **Claims.**

25 “Under the rule’s permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are  
 26 reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially

1 identical.” *Parsons*, 754 F.3d at 685 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Typicality refers  
 2 to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from  
 3 which it arose or the relief sought.” *Id.* (quoting *Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp.*, 976 F.2d 497,  
 4 508 (9th Cir. 1992).

5 Here, Representative Plaintiffs Moussouris and Muenchow both worked in the  
 6 Engineering profession during the class period, and Plaintiff Muenchow worked in the I/T  
 7 Operations profession as well. More importantly, the nature of their claims is co-extensive with  
 8 the class claims for discrimination in pay and promotions. Plaintiff Moussouris alleged that  
 9 Microsoft paid her less than her male peers throughout her tenure at the company and  
 10 discriminated against her in the promotion process. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 65-68; *see also*  
 11 Moussouris Dec., ¶¶ 3-5. For example, “[f]rom 2010 to 2014, Microsoft passed her over for  
 12 promotions in favor of less qualified and less experienced men.” Sec. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 66-68; *see*  
 13 *also* Moussouris Dec., ¶ 4. Similarly, Ms. Muenchow alleges that she has been paid less than  
 14 comparable male coworkers and that men have been promoted to higher levels for which she was  
 15 qualified and not considered. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 75-76; *see also* Muenchow Dec., ¶¶ 3-4.<sup>61</sup>  
 16 Typicality is satisfied.

17 **4. The Representative Plaintiffs and Class Counsel Will Adequately**  
 18 **Protect the Interests of the Class.**

19 To determine whether Representative plaintiffs will adequately represent a class, courts  
 20 must resolve two questions: ““(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of  
 21 interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute  
 22 the action vigorously on behalf of the class?”” *Ellis*, 657 F.3d at 985 (quoting *Hanlon v.*  
 23 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998)). Here, neither the Representative Plaintiffs

24 <sup>61</sup> *See also* Alberts Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Boeh Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Dove Decl., ¶¶ 5-7; Hutson Decl., ¶ 5;  
 25 Miller Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Smith Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Sowinska Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Underwood Decl., ¶ 5; Vaughn  
 26 Decl., ¶ 5; Warren Decl., ¶¶ 5-6 (collectively describing experiencing discrimination in pay and  
 promotions).

1 nor their counsel have any conflicts of interest with the Class; to the contrary, their interests in  
 2 remedying the systemic gender discrimination at Microsoft are directly aligned with the interests  
 3 of the Class. Also, the Representative Plaintiffs and counsel have demonstrated that they will  
 4 vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the Class. The Representative Plaintiffs have  
 5 demonstrated their commitment to the Class throughout this litigation by answering document  
 6 requests and interrogatories, appearing for depositions, and serving as advisors to counsel.  
 7 Moussouris Dec., ¶ 8; Muenchow Dec., ¶ 8. Counsel for Plaintiffs have also prosecuted this  
 8 action vigorously—by, *e.g.*, litigating multiple motions to dismiss and motions to compel, and  
 9 engaging in extensive discovery (over 220,000 documents exchanged and 13 depositions taken)  
 10 through which counsel have demonstrated their dedication to the Class—and will continue to do  
 11 so. Shaver Decl., ¶ 4. Further, counsel have extensive experience in prosecuting gender  
 12 discrimination class actions and will continue to commit the time and resources to represent this  
 13 Class. Dermody Decl., ¶¶ 4-8; Klein Decl., ¶¶ 4-7, Subit Decl., ¶¶ 6-8.

14 **C. Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2) is Warranted for Liability and Injunctive**  
 15 **Relief.**

16 “Rule 23(b)(2) permits class actions for declaratory or injunctive relief where ‘the party  
 17 opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.’ Civil  
 18 rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime  
 19 examples.” *Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (citations omitted). *See*  
 20 *also Parsons*, 754 F.3d at 686 (“[T]he primary role of this provision has always been the  
 21 certification of civil rights class actions.”). In fact, “subdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in  
 22 1966 in part to make it clear that civil-rights suits for injunctive or declaratory relief can be  
 23 brought as class actions.” Wright & Miller, *7AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.* § 1776 (3d ed.).

24 In *Dukes*, the Supreme Court has explained:

25 The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive  
 26 or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is  
 such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of  
 the class members or as to none of them. In other words, Rule

1 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory  
 2 judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does  
 3 not authorize class certification when each individual class  
 member would be entitled to a *different* injunction or declaratory  
 judgment against the defendant.

4 *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 360 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs seek a  
 5 declaration that Microsoft's existing Calibration process is unlawful (*i.e.*, declaratory relief), and  
 6 an order enjoining Microsoft from using it to make pay and promotion decisions in the future.  
 7 All class members have been subjected to the Calibration process, and an order pronouncing it  
 8 unlawful and preventing its further use would provide relief to the Class as a whole. Not only  
 9 would it stop the use of a discriminatory practice, but it would also entitle all Class members to a  
 10 presumption of make whole relief in the damages phase of the case. *Ellis*, 285 F.R.D. at 505;  
 11 *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 352 n.7, 366 (quoting *Teamsters*, 431 U.S. at 361). *See also Parsons*, 754  
 12 F.3d at 688 (“[Rule 23(b)(2)’s] requirements are unquestionably satisfied when members of a  
 13 putative class seek uniform injunctive or declaratory relief from policies or practices that are  
 14 generally applicable to the class as a whole.”).<sup>62</sup>

15 For exactly these reasons, courts have long recognized that disparate impact and disparate  
 16 treatment claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate for certification under  
 17 23(b)(2). *See, e.g., McReynolds*, 672 F.3d at 491-92 (certifying (b)(2) class for liability and  
 18 injunctive relief in disparate impact case); *Houser v. Pritzker*, 28 F. Supp. 3d 222 (S.D.N.Y.  
 19 2014) (same); *Easterling v. Connecticut Dep't of Correction*, 278 F.R.D. 41, 47 (D. Conn. 2011)

20 <sup>62</sup> *Parsons* is an Eighth Amendment case in which plaintiffs alleged that a class of inmates was  
 21 subjected to common policies and practices of the Department of Corrections that created a  
 22 substantial risk of serious harm, injury, or death. 754 F.3d at 663. The common practices that  
 23 plaintiffs complained of included inadequate staffing, denials of dental care, lack of emergency  
 24 treatment, failure to stock and provide critical medication, substandard dental care, and failure to  
 25 provide therapy and psychiatric medication to mentally ill patients. *Id.* The court found that  
 26 “these policies and practices are the ‘glue’ that holds together the putative class; either each of  
 the policies and practices is unlawful as to every inmate or it is not.” *Id.* at 678. Though not a  
 Title VII case, *Parsons* is still instructive as to the Ninth Circuit’s application of the requirements  
 of 23(a)(2) and (b)(2) to class claims for liability and injunctive relief against a common set of  
 policies and practices, as Plaintiffs present here.

1 (same); *Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of New York*, 907 F. Supp. 2d 492, 509  
 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), *aff'd sub nom. Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. of New York City Sch. Dist. of City of*  
 3 *New York*, 555 F. App'x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (same); *Ellis*, 285 F.R.D. at 537 (certifying (b)(2)  
 4 class for liability and injunctive relief in disparate treatment and disparate impact case); *Scott v.*  
 5 *Family Dollar Stores, Inc.*, No. 3:08-cv-00540, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105267 (W.D.N.C. June  
 6 24, 2016) (same); *Williams*, 225 F.R.D. at 632, 638 (same); *Beck*, 60 F. App'x at \*39 (affirming  
 7 certification of (b)(2) class for liability and injunctive relief in disparate treatment case). The  
 8 claims in this case also warrant certification for liability and injunctive relief.

9 **D. Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3) is Warranted for Liability and Monetary**  
 10 **Damages.**

11 The Supreme Court has clarified that “individualized monetary claims belong in Rule  
 12 23(b)(3).” *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 362. Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common issues predominate over  
 13 individual issues, and that a class action be superior to other available methods for the fair and  
 14 efficient adjudication of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “Predominance is not, however, a  
 15 matter of nose-counting. Rather, more important questions apt to drive the resolution of the  
 16 litigation are given more weight in the predominance analysis over individualized questions  
 17 which are of considerably less significance to the claims of the class.” *Torres v. Mercer*  
 18 *Canyons Inc.*, 835 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

19 **1. Common Questions of Liability and Damages Predominate Over**  
 20 **Individual Damages Issues.**

21 For both Plaintiffs’ disparate impact and disparate treatment claims, common questions  
 22 of liability and damages predominate over individual damages issues.

23 With respect to Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim, whether Microsoft’s Calibration  
 24 process has a disparate impact on women in pay and promotions, whether that practice is  
 25 nonetheless justified by business necessity, and whether alternative less-discriminatory practices  
 26 exist, are common issues which will be proved or disproved using only common evidence. *Ellis*,

1 285 F.R.D. at 538. The first question will be determined based on statistical evidence, and the  
2 second based on common, classwide evidence about the policies themselves, including the  
3 testimony of the parties’ Industrial Organizational psychology experts. These common issues of  
4 liability clearly predominate; indeed, “adjudicating these issues on a classwide basis is necessary  
5 before any individualized proceeding can occur.” *Id.* See also *Moore v. Napolitano*, 926 F.  
6 Supp. 2d 8, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding predominance satisfied where “all members of the  
7 class will rely on the same statistical evidence to make the same [disparate impact] claim”);  
8 *Parra*, 291 F.R.D. at 392 (adopting the rationale of *Ellis* and holding that “the common questions  
9 regarding liability as to the pay claim are ‘a significant aspect of this case and they can be  
10 resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication’”); *Easterling*, 278 F.R.D. at 48-49  
11 (certifying liability and damages claims under Rule 23(b)(3) because both prima facie case of  
12 disparate impact and defenses thereto are subject to generalized proof).

13 With respect to Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim, whether Microsoft operated under a  
14 general policy of discrimination, such that all class members are entitled to a presumption of  
15 discrimination under *Teamsters*, is a common question that will be proved or disproved based on  
16 common evidence. First and foremost, Plaintiffs offer statistical evidence of significant  
17 disparities in pay and promotions for females in Engineering and I/T Operations. Second,  
18 Plaintiffs offer evidence of a pervasive companywide culture that underlies and informs the  
19 Calibration process from which these disparities emerge. Third, Plaintiffs offer evidence that  
20 senior leadership at Microsoft knew of both the disparities and the cultural bias, and failed to  
21 correct them. This evidence is substantial and is common to the class. Similarly, Microsoft’s  
22 predicted defense to this claim—that Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is inaccurate or  
23 insignificant—also rests on common evidence. “This pattern and practice question predominates  
24 because it has a direct impact on every class member’s effort to establish liability and on every  
25 class member’s entitlement to . . . monetary relief.” *Ellis*, 285 F.R.D. at 538 (quoting *Ingram v.*  
26 *The Coca-Cola Co.*, 200 F.R.D. 685, 699 (N.D. Ga. 2001). See also *Scott*, 2016 U.S. Dist.

1 LEXIS 105267 at \*26 (“[T]he predominance standard of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied because  
2 plaintiffs have proffered evidence of class-wide pattern-or-practice and/or disparate impact that  
3 could establish liability, and result in class-wide entitlement to: (1) affirmative injunctive and  
4 declaratory relief to undo the effects of such disparate impact and/or class-wide pattern-or-  
5 practice; and (2) a presumption of individualized harm for each class member.”); *Sellars v. CRST*  
6 *Expedited, Inc.*, No. C15-117-LTS, 2017 WL 1193730, at \*21-22 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 30, 2017)  
7 (certifying liability phase of disparate treatment claim under Rule 23(b)(3) and holding that  
8 “[t]he potential need for individual damage calculations at a later stage is typically not decisive  
9 of the predominance factor”).

10 Although every Title VII case presents some individualized questions with respect to  
11 class member entitlement to relief, the Ninth Circuit has long held that individualized damages  
12 issues do not defeat predominance. *See, e.g., Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc.*, 716 F.3d 510, 514  
13 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The amount of damages is invariably an individual question and does not defeat  
14 class action treatment.”) (quoting *Blackie v. Barrack*, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir.1975)). This is  
15 no less true in the Title VII context than any other, as every case cited herein certifying a Title  
16 VII claim makes clear. The Court may deal with damages issues in one of at least two  
17 recognized ways. First, the Court may employ the *Teamsters* framework, whereby individual  
18 class members will present their eligibility for relief in a second phase of trial if liability is  
19 established. Importantly, these “individualized hearings that may be conducted in the second  
20 phase of the trial ‘are narrow in scope and significance when compared to the threshold, class-  
21 wide issues subject to generalized proof.” *Rollins*, 2016 WL 258523 at \*15 (quoting *Ellis*,  
22 *supra*). They also are made more efficient by the “presumption of individualized harm for each  
23 class member” afforded by a class victory in the liability phase. *Scott*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  
24 105267 at \*26. Alternatively, the Court may choose to certify both liability and damages for  
25 class treatment based on the common issues presented with respect to damages, which include:  
26 classwide calculation of baseline backpay on a year-by-year basis; class-wide determination on

1 how to calculate compensation for lost promotions; class-wide establishment of what non-  
2 discriminatory bases Microsoft may use to claim a plaintiff would not have been promoted; and a  
3 class-wide process to collect information from plaintiffs regarding mitigation. *See Gulino v. Bd.*  
4 *of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of New York*, No. 96 CV 8414 KMW, 2013 WL 4647190, at  
5 \*11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013) (certifying liability and damages in disparate impact case under  
6 23(b)(3) where “resolving common issues with respect to damages at a class-wide proceeding  
7 will save substantial time and prevent the relitigation of common claims”). *See also Easterling*,  
8 278 F.R.D. at 48-49 (certifying liability and damages in disparate impact case under 23(b)(3)  
9 because common issues as to damages, including the total amount of back pay that should be  
10 awarded to the class, predominated over individual issues, which included each member’s  
11 eligibility to be in the class and qualification for position).

12 Plaintiffs’ proposed trial plan (set forth below) reflects the Court’s options. While  
13 Plaintiffs believe that both liability and damages should be certified here, at minimum the Court  
14 should certify the liability phase under Rule 23(b)(2), (b)(3) or (c)(4) (issue certification).

## 15 **2. Plaintiffs Satisfy Superiority.**

16 The superiority inquiry directs the Court to consider four factors—the class members’  
17 interests in controlling litigation, the nature and extent of litigation, the desirability of  
18 concentrating the litigation of the claims, and the manageability of the case as a class action.  
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

20 All four factors readily support certification. Plaintiffs are not aware of any pending  
21 gender discrimination litigation commenced by or against Class members on the same issues.  
22 Class members’ interests are not served by individual suits under their control. As this Court has  
23 recognized, these are “negative value” claims such that the cost of prosecuting them would  
24 exceed the potential income, particularly “against a resource-heavy organization such as  
25 defendants’.” *Beck*, 203 F.R.D. at 466-67. In addition, Class members benefit from remaining  
26 anonymous, rather than risking their reputations and careers by bringing a lawsuit in their own

1 names. Likewise, Plaintiffs have already conducted extensive discovery and litigation in this  
 2 forum. It would be far more efficient and convenient to continue litigating common questions  
 3 here. *Easterling*, 278 F.R.D. at 50.

4 As for manageability, Plaintiffs' proposed trial plan shows how this case may be  
 5 efficiently litigated as a class action:

6 **Stage One: Liability**

- 7 1) Disparate Treatment Liability: the parties will litigate whether Microsoft is liable  
 8 for disparate treatment. This claim will be tried to a jury. Plaintiffs will have the  
 9 initial burden to show that discrimination was Microsoft's standard operating  
 10 procedure. If that prima facie case is established, Microsoft will have the  
 11 opportunity to rebut the Plaintiffs' evidence by showing it to be either inaccurate  
 12 or insignificant. Whichever party prevails on the preponderance of the evidence  
 13 will win the liability phase. If Plaintiffs prevail, the jury will determine whether  
 14 punitive damages should be awarded, but not the amount of punitive damages.<sup>63</sup>
- 15 2) Disparate Impact Liability: the parties will litigate whether Microsoft is liable for  
 16 disparate impact. This claim will be tried to the Court. Plaintiffs have the initial  
 17 burden to show that Microsoft's Calibration process causes statistically significant  
 18 pay and promotion disparities for the proposed Class. If Plaintiffs establish their  
 19 prima facie case, the burden will shift to Microsoft to prove, as an affirmative  
 20 defense, that its Calibration process is based on legitimate business necessity.

21  
 22  
 23 <sup>63</sup> See *Ellis*, 285 F.R.D. at 542 (“The Court concludes that while the availability of punitive  
 24 damages should be adjudicated in Stage One of the trial, determination of the aggregate amount  
 25 and individual distribution of punitive damages should be reserved for Stage Two. Such an  
 26 arrangement will take advantage of the bifurcated trial procedure while safeguarding  
 Defendant's right to ensure that any punitive damages award remains tethered to the  
 compensatory damages actually awarded in Stage Two, consistent with *State Farm*.”) (citing  
*State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell*, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)).

1 Plaintiffs will then have the opportunity to show that Microsoft could have used a  
2 less discriminatory alternative practice.

- 3 3) Result of Verdicts: If Plaintiffs prevail on either claim, the entire class is entitled  
4 to a declaration of liability, a presumption of individual make-whole relief, and,  
5 importantly, a class-wide injunction against the continuation of the discriminatory  
6 practice as well as other reforms that may be fashioned by the Court, if warranted.  
7 The case would then proceed to Stage Two. If Plaintiffs do not prevail on either  
8 claim, the case is over.

9 **Stage Two: Damages**

- 10 1) Option One: The Court first resolves common damages questions, which can  
11 include the aggregate amount of backpay owed to the Class if the Court deems  
12 that approach appropriate. Then the Court (or special master) will hold *Teamsters*  
13 hearings, or use written questionnaires, to narrow and/or adjudicate issues around  
14 individual class members' eligibility for relief, the amount of relief, and share of  
15 punitive damages each is entitled to recover.
- 16 2) Option Two: The Court (or special master) will hold *Teamsters* hearings to  
17 adjudicate individual entitlement to backpay and compensatory damages, as well  
18 as the individual's share of any punitive damages.

19 This proposed trial plan follows a well-trodden path in Title VII class litigation, both  
20 before and after *Dukes*. See, e.g., *Teamsters*, 431 U.S. at 361; *Ellis*, 285 F.R.D. at 505; *Robinson*  
21 *v. Metro-North Commuter R.R Co.*, 267 F.3d 147, 161 (2d. Cir. 2001); *U.S. v. City of New York*,  
22 276 F.R.D. 22, 32-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); *Velez v. Novartis Pharma. Corp.*, 244 F.R.D. 243, 243  
23 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).



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